Detecting Clusters of Anomalies on Low-Dimensional Feature Subsets with
  Application to Network Traffic Flow Data by Qiu, Zhicong et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
51
1.
01
04
7v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 10
 Ju
n 2
01
5
1
Detecting Clusters of Anomalies on
Low-Dimensional Feature Subsets with
Application to Network Traffic Flow Data
Zhicong Qiu, David J. Miller and George Kesidis
School of EECS, The Pennsylvania State University
{zzq101,djm25,gik2}@psu.edu
Abstract
In a variety of applications, one desires to detect groups of anomalous data samples, with a group
potentially manifesting its atypicality (relative to a reference model) on a low-dimensional subset of
the full measured set of features. Samples may only be weakly atypical individually, whereas they
may be strongly atypical when considered jointly. What makes this group anomaly detection problem
quite challenging is that it is a priori unknown which subset of features jointly manifests a particular
group of anomalies. Moreover, it is unknown how many anomalous groups are present in a given data
batch. In this work, we develop a group anomaly detection (GAD) scheme to identify the subset of
samples and subset of features that jointly specify an anomalous cluster. We apply our approach to
network intrusion detection to detect BotNet and peer-to-peer flow clusters. Unlike previous studies, our
approach captures and exploits statistical dependencies that may exist between the measured features.
Experiments on real world network traffic data demonstrate the advantage of our proposed system, and
highlight the importance of exploiting feature dependency structure, compared to the feature (or test)
independence assumption made in previous studies.
Index Terms
Bonferroni correction, group anomaly detection, Gaussian Mixture Model, p-value, network intru-
sion detection, BotNet, dependence tree
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Group anomaly detection has recently attracted much attention, with applications in astronomy
[14], social media [15], disease/custom control [9][3] and network intrusion detection [11][5][4].
In this work, we focus on group anomaly detection applied to network intrusion detection, where
the anomalous groups are either distributed Botnet (Zeus) or peer-to-peer (P2P) nodes generating
traffic that deviates from the normal (Web traffic) behavior. Many existing intrusion detection
systems (IDSs) only make sample-wise anomaly detections, e.g., in [12], the samples which
deviate most from a normal (reference) model are flagged as anomalies/outliers. However, such an
approach does not identify anomalous groups (e.g., a collection of BotNet flows), whose samples
all exhibit similar behavior. Identifying such groups could be essential for mounting some form
of system response or defense. Moreover, individual samples may only be weakly atypical. Thus,
a sample-wise IDS may either fail to detect most of the anomalous samples, or may incur high
false positives when a low detection threshold is used. By contrast, (weakly) anomalous samples
whose anomalies are all “similar to each other” may be strongly atypical when considered in
aggregate, i.e. jointly. For example, for an N = 100-dimensional feature space, suppose there is a
sizeable collection of samples in the captured data batch that are all (even only weakly) atypical
with respect to the same feature or the same (small) feature subset. There is a low probability
that this occurs by chance, (i.e.,under the null). Thus, such clusters of anomalies, each defined
by a sample subset and a feature subset, may be strongly atypical, and hence more convincing
anomalies, than individual sample anomalies. It should be noted that there is an enormous number
of candidate anomalous clusters, considering the conjoining of all possible sample subsets and all
possible feature subsets. Thus, a GAD scheme will require some type of heuristic search over this
huge space, aiming to detect the most statistically significant cluster candidates. In the sequel,
we propose such a GAD scheme. Rather than assuming individual features or outlier events are
statistically independent under the null as in [9], [5], in our approach, as in [10], we capture and
exploit statistical dependencies amongst the features defining a candidate cluster. Compared to
previous works, as shown in our experiments, the proposed scheme is more effective in detecting
group anomalies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the problem and elaborates on related
works. Section III describes the proposed model. Section IV evaluates the system performance,
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3and compares with some recent works. We then discuss some extensions of our system and
future works in section V, followed by conclusions.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND RELATED WORK
We assume there is a batch of normal web traffic available at the outset as training set, i.e.
Xl = {x˜i, i = 1, ..., Tl, x˜i ∈ R
D}, where x˜i is a D-dimensional feature vector representing the
i-th training traffic flow1, and where we assume the number of training flows Tl is large enough
to learn an accurate reference model (null hypothesis). These traffic flows can either be generated
and captured in a sandbox environment, or sampled from a domain of interest (data warehouse,
enterprise network) in real time under normal operating conditions. Given a model of normal
network traffic learned based on Xl, our goal is to interrogate a capture batch of unknown traffic
flows Xu = {xi, i = 1, ..., Tu, xi ∈ RD}2, seeking to identify latent groups of Botnet or P2P
traffic, with the flows in each such group exhibiting similar behavior. This has been previously
considered in [5], where the authors used the samples in Xl to estimate bivariate Gaussian
Mixture Models (GMMs), on all feature pairs, representing the null hypothesis. These bivariate
GMMs were used to evaluate mixture-based p-values3 for all pairs of features. Assuming the
features (tests) are statistically independent, a joint significance score function was defined for
a given candidate cluster, specified by its sample subset and feature subset, with a Bonferroni
correction used to account for multiple testing. Instead of exhaustively searching over feature
subset candidates at order K 4, the authors proposed to trial-add individual features only to
the top-ranking candidate feature subsets (in terms of the Bonferroni corrected score) at order
K − 1. Furthermore, the authors showed that the computational complexity of determining the
optimal (in terms of the joint score) sample subset given the feature subset fixed is linear in Tu,
once the samples in a given feature subset are ranked by their aggregate p-values. However, the
independent test assumption used in [5] becomes grossly invalid as more and more features are
included in a cluster, which limits the proposed model’s detection accuracy for increasing K.
A related framework was also proposed in [9], albeit assuming categorical attributes. Here, the
1A flow is a bidirectional communication sequence between a pair of nodes in a network.
2Unknown in the sense that we do not know which if any of these flows represent outliers or attacks.
3A p-value is the probability that an event is more extreme than the given observation.
4We use “order” to denote the maximum feature dimension considered.
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4authors built a single, global null hypothesis Bayesian network based on Xl. They then assigned
categorical-based p-values to samples in Xu, with a cross entropy based scoring criterion used to
efficiently search for the best feature and sample subset candidates. A limitation of this approach
is that the statistical tests are again assumed to be independent.
We herein describe and experiment with a method of anomaly detection that extends [9],
[5] and is closely related to [10]. The method captures dependencies between the features in
a candidate cluster by a dependence tree structure, and uses this model to help evaluate joint
p-values for cluster candidates. As in [5], the Bonferroni corrected score is used as the objective
function for evaluating the best cluster candidates (defined by their sample and feature subsets).
The candidate with the best such score is detected as a cluster of anomalies. Whereas in [9] a
single global (null model) Bayesian network is used to assess candidate clusters, in [10] and in
the current work a local, customized cluster-specific dependence tree model is used to assess
each candidate cluster.
III. PROPOSED MODEL
A. Mixture-based P-values for Singletons and Feature Pairs
Consider a (sample, feature) index pair (i, j) and let I(j)i be an indicator variable for the event
that the jth feature value of the ith sample, x(j)i , is an outlier with respect to the null distribution
for feature X(j). Let O(j)(x(j)i ) be a subset of the real line such that, ∀y(j) ∈ O(j)(x
(j)
i ), y
(j) is
“more extreme” than the given observation x(j)i . One good definition for this set, consistent with
evaluating a 2-sided p-value for a unimodal, symmetric null for X(j), is:
O(j)(x
(j)
i ;µ
(j)) = {y(j) : |y(j) − µ(j)| ≥ |x
(j)
i − µ
(j)|},
where µ(j) is a representative (mean) value for feature X(j). Given the component means µ(j)l , l =
1, ..., Lj , of an Lj-component Gaussian mixture null, let M (j)(x) be a function that maps x to the
mixture component index set {1, 2, ..., Lj}, i.e., it indicates which mixture component generated
x. Also, let Yj be a random variable distributed according to the mixture density fXj (x). Then,
for a given observation x(j)i , we define the binary random variable I
(j)
i , where I
(j)
i = 1 if Yj is
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5more extreme under the null than x(j)i . Then, we can write the singleton mixture p-value as:
P [I
(j)
i = 1]
= P [Yj ∈ ∪
L
l=1((O
(j)(x
(j)
i ;µ
(j)
l )) ∩ (M
(j)(x
(j)
i ) = l))]
=
L∑
l=1
P [Yj ∈ O
(j)(x
(j)
i ;µ
(j)
l )]P [M
(j)(x
(j)
i ) = l]. (1)
Here, an extreme outlier event is conditioned on x(j)i having been generated by component
density l. The probability P [Yj ∈ O(j)(x(j)i ;µ
(j)
l )] is the two-sided Gaussian p-value, integrating
over the region |y − µ(j)l | ≥ |x
(j)
i − µ
(j)
l |, while P [M (j)(x
(j)
i ) = l] is the a posteriori probability
that x(j)i was generated by component l.
Similarly, for a pair of observations (x(j)i , x
(k)
i ), we have the second order mixture p-value:
P [I
(j)
i = 1, I
(k)
i = 1]
=
L∑
l=1
P [Yj ∈ O
(j)(x
(j)
i ;µ
(j)
l ), Yk ∈ O
(k)(x
(k)
i ;µ
(k)
l )]
· P [M (j,k)(x
(j)
i , x
(k)
i ) = l].
Here, P [Yj ∈ O(j)(x
(j)
i ;µ
(j)
l ), Yk ∈ O
(k)(x
(k)
i ;µ
(k)
l )] integrates the l-th component bivariate
Gaussian density over the region
{(yj , yk) : |yj − µ
(j)
l | ≥ |x
(j)
i − µ
(j)
l |, |yk − µ
(k)
l | ≥ |x
(k)
i − µ
(k)
l |}.
This region consists of the union of four unbounded rectangular regions in the plane, as illustrated
in Figure 1.
In this work, a sample’s anomalousness on a given feature subset is estimated by a joint
p-value, with statistical dependencies between features accounted for by a dependence tree (DT)
structure [2]. Since the dependence tree [2] is based on first and second order probabilities, the
joint p-value will be based on the singleton and second order mixture p-values, as given above.
A smaller joint p-value indicates a sample is more anomalous under the given feature subset.
B. Scoring Clusters
Let {Ic, Jc} denote cluster candidate c, Ic its sample subset and Jc its feature subset. Let
Tc = |Ic|, Nc = |Jc|. Note that p-values are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] under the null. Thus,
November 4, 2015 DRAFT
6Fig. 1: Illustrative figure: bivariate Gaussian joint p-value measure coresponds to the four
(unbounded) shaded corners in grey, with mean µ and a given observation x
given a cluster with feature subset Jc, from a test batch of size Tu, the probability that at least
one cluster with Tc samples has a smaller p-value than P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i ) = 1] is:
1− (1−
∏
i
P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i ) = 1])
C(Tu,Tc) (2)
Here, C(Tu, Tc) =
(
Tu
Tc
)
, i.e. it is the number of combinations and implements multiple testing
correction, accounting for all possible sample subset configurations in a cluster with Tc samples,
from a test batch of size Tu. In principle, (2) provides a sound basis at least for directly comparing
all cluster candidates with the same feature subset Jc. However, it does not allow comparing
pairs of cluster candidates with any configurations of (Tc, Nc), because all possible feature subset
configurations at a given order, Nc, have not yet been properly multiple-testing corrected. Also,
(2) requires evaluation of the joint p-value P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i ) = 1]), ∀i ∈ Ic, which in general depends
on the joint density function for (Xj1, Xj2, ..., XjNc ), jm ∈ Jc, m = 1, ..., Nc. When D is large, it
is not practically feasible to learn and store these
(
D
Nc
)
joint null density functions, i.e., for all
possible combinations of features up to order Nc. Thus, it appears some tractable representation
of P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i ) = 1]) is needed. An obvious temptation is to assume that I
(j)
i and I
(j′)
i are
statistically independent ∀j, j′ ∈ Jc, j′ 6= j. But this is a very poor assumption, consistent with
assuming the features are independent.
To address the above problems, we seek to modify (2) in two respects. First, we propose
to multiple test correct both for the different sample and the different feature subsets, given
November 4, 2015 DRAFT
7a cluster candidate with (Tc, Nc). In this approach, instead of the exponent being the num-
ber of combinations, it becomes the product of combinations on samples and combinations
on features. Based on the Bonferroni approximation of (2), we have the joint score function
S(Ic, Jc) =
(
D
Nc
)(
T
Tc
)∏
i∈Ic
P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i ) = 1]). For this joint significance measure, we can
efficiently determine the optimal sample subset, given a fixed feature subset, by greedy sequential
sample inclusion, in sorted joint p-value order. This is due to the unimodality of this Bonferroni
approximated joint significance measure, as a function of the number of samples included in a
cluster’s sample subset (see next subsection).
Second, a rich, tractable, joint probability mass function model that does capture statistical
dependencies is a restricted form of Bayesian network, based exclusively on first and second order
distributions, i.e., the dependence tree (DT), which factorizes the joint distribution P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i ) =
1]) as a product of first and second order probabilities [2]. In [2], it was shown that, even
though there is an enormous number of unique dependence tree structures, one can efficiently
find the globally optimal dependence tree, over all such structures, maximizing the dataset’s log-
likelihood, by realizing that this can be recast as a maximum weight spanning tree problem, with
the pairwise weights defined as the mutual information between the pairs of random variables.
The maximum weight spanning tree can be efficiently solved via Kruskal’s algorithm, with
complexity O(N2c log(Nc)). Hence, given any candidate feature subset Jc, Kruskal’s algorithm
can be applied to determine the DT that maximizes the likelihood measured on Xl, i.e., the null
hypothesis is determined, consistent with the given candidate feature subset Jc.
Based on a given DT structure, P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i ) = 1]) factorizes as a product of first and second
order distributions, i.e., ∀i ∈ Ic:
P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i )] = P [I
(j1)
i ]P [I
(j2)
i |I
(j1)
i ]...P [I
(jNc)
i |I
(jNc−1)
i ], (3)
where we use j1 to denote the root node of the DT representing Jc.
It is apparent from (3) that, for any feature subset, one can represent the joint p-value of a
given sample by its first and second order mixture p-values. That is, for any feature pair (j, k),
P [I
(j)
i |I
(k)
i ] =
P [I
(j)
i ,I
(k)
i ]
P [I
(k)
i ]
. The numerator and denominator are, respectively, the second and first
order mixture-based p-values that we defined earlier. Also note that, in order to evaluate the first
order mixture p-value P [I(k)i ], we marginalize feature j from the bivariate GMM for the feature
pair (j, k). This gives us the GMM for feature k.
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8C. Identifying the Optimal Sample Subset Ic, Given Fixed Jc
Given a fixed Jc and associated DT, we would like to choose the sample subset Ic to minimize
(2). Applying the Bonferroni correction, this is essentially equivalent to choosing Ic to minimize
the joint score function:
S(Ic, Jc) =
(
D
Nc
)(
Tu
Tc
)∏
i∈Ic
P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i ) = 1]). (4)
It is in fact easily shown that this objective function is globally minimized by the following
procedure: i) sort the samples in increasing order of their joint p-values P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i ) = 1]; ii)
sequentially include the samples on the sorted list into Ic, until the objective function no longer
decreases. This procedure globally minimizes over Ic given fixed Jc.
D. Overall Search Algorithm
First, using the normal samples in Xl, all the first and second order null GMMs are separately
trained 5. Mutual information for all feature pairs is then calculated based on the bivariate GMMs.
This is achieved by generating M = 106 samples from a given bivariate GMM distribution, and
then estimating the mutual information by 1
M
M∑
n=1
log(
fX1X2(x
(n)
1 ,x
(n)
2 )
fX1(x
(n)
1 )fX2 (x
(n)
2 )
. We then detect clusters in
Xu sequentially, in a rank-prioritized fashion, according to the joint score S(Ic, Jc). The algorithm
operates on an enormous space of candidate clusters even if the feature space itself is only
5Separately learning each marginal and pairwise feature GMM using the common training set Xl will not ensure consistency
with respect to feature marginalizations. Specifically, a marginal-consistent collection of univariate and bivariate density functions
should satisfy the following: if we consider any feature pairs (i, j) and (j, k), marginalizing out feature i from the (i, j) bivariate
density and marginalizing out feature k from the (j, k) bivariate density should lead to the same marginal density for feature
j. However, when the univariate and bivariate distributions are Gaussian mixtures, with a non-convex log-likelihood function
(and with BIC-based model order selection separately applied to choose the number of components for each GMM), separate
application of EM-plus-BIC to learn each GMM density function does not ensure a set of marginal-consistent distributions.
This property is not centrally important here, however, since our main concern is only to learn marginal and pairwise density
functions that allow accurate assessment of p-values. Accordingly, in this work we will apply EM-plus-BIC separately, to learn
each low-order GMM.
One approach to obtain marginal-consistent low-order distributions is to simply learn the single GMM for the joint distribution
on the full feature vector, X . This determines (via marginalization) all lower-order distributions (which are also GMMs, and
which are guaranteed to be marginal-consistent). However, this strategy suffers from the curse of dimensionality. Alternatively,
we refer the interested reader to [10], where a procedure for directly, jointly learning a marginal-consistent set of low-order
GMMs is elaborated.
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9modestly sized (D). We start by sweeping over feature subset candidates at low orders and, for
tractability, only the “most promising” candidates at higher orders, with candidate feature subsets
at order K formed by “accreting” new features to the best-scoring candidates at order K − 1.
For each candidate feature subset Jc, its DT is first learned and its associated, optimal subset Ic
is then determined using the method described in section III.C. Evaluating all candidates at all
feature subset orders, the one with the best score function value at each order Nc is recorded.
The cluster with smallest Bonferroni-corrected score S(Ic, Jc) is then forwarded as detected.
Its samples are then removed from the test batch. Subsequent cluster detections can then be
made following the same procedure. Cluster detections are thus made (in general) in order of
decreasing joint significance.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
Our experiments focus on detecting Zeus botnet and P2P traffic among normal Web traffic. The
Web packet-flows are obtained from the LBNL repository [6]. This dataset contains Web traffic
on TCP port 80, with specified time-of-day information. Specifically, the experiments in this
paper are based on three datasets named “200412215-0510.port008”, “20041215-1343.port008”
and “20041215-1443.port010”. The protocols to obtain normal, P2P and BotNet network traffic
are the same as in [5], i.e., we used the port-mapper in [16] to identify P2P traffic in these files
by a C4.5 decision tree pre-trained in another domain (the Cambridge dataset [7]). The Zeus
Botnet traffic are obtained from another domain [13].
A. Feature Space Selection and Representation
Firstly, we did not use layer-4 port number features for purposes of detection [16], [1]. Also,
we did not consider timing information herein because the Zeus activity was recorded on another
domain [1]. In [1], previous efforts were made to detect BotNet and P2P traffic using the well-
known feature representation for network intrusion detection from [8]. The authors found that
these features, though able to detect some attack activity, could not successfully discriminate
BotNet or P2P from normal Web traffic, i.e., BotNet and P2P traffic appear as “normal” Web
activity according to the features of [8], [1].
To capture the intrinsic behavior of BotNet and P2P packet-traffic, we note that most Zeus
BotNet traffic involves masters giving command (control) messages, while slaves execute the
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given commands. In the case of P2P, nodes often communicate in a bidirectional manner,
exchanging relatively large packets in both directions. Normal/background Web traffic, on the
other hand, tends to involve server-to-client communications.
Hence, we seek to preserve the bidirectional packet size sequence information as feature
representation for different traffic flows. This feature representation was previously considered in
[5], [11]. The authors used the first N (we set N = 10 in our experiments) packets after the three-
way hand shake of each TCP flow. Then a feature vector of dimension 2N is defined, specified
by the sizes and directionalities of these N packets. Traffic are assumed to be alternating between
client-to-server (CS) and server-to-client (SC). A zero packet size is thus inserted between two
consecutive packets in the same direction to indicate an absence of a packet in the other direction.
For example, if the bidirectional traffic is strictly SC, a zero will be inserted after each SC packet
size. This 2N-dimensional feature representation preserves bidirectional information of a given
TCP flow, which is essential for discriminating between P2P, Zeus and normal Web traffic.
B. Performance Metrics
Our algorithm detects clusters (groups) in a sequential fashion. For each extracted group, we
rank the samples in the group by their associated joint p-values on the given feature subset. These
samples will be sequentially removed from the test batch, with the system then continuing to
extract groups until the test set is depleted. Then we sweep out an ROC curve based on these
rank-ordered detected samples. A larger area under the ROC curve indicates earlier detections of
anomalous groups, which implies the effectiveness of the intrusion detection system. We compare
our system’s performance with a GMM based anomaly detector, trained by normal samples, on
the whole feature space. For this detector, we rank the test samples based on their data likelihood
under the GMM, and sweep out an ROC curve. We also compare with the approach presented
in [5], which assumes significance tests are independent (denoted “Independence tests”), and
with the recent work presented in [9] with a slight modification – instead of discretizing feature
values consistent with [9], we use a single dependence tree null distribution learned on Xl and
our proposed joint p-value for continuous features, P [ ∩
j∈Jc
(I
(j)
i ) = 1]. We denote this variation
on the approach in [9] by “single Bayesian Net.” There are two generalization performance
measures of interest on the test set: one is the aforementioned ROC area under curve (ROC
AUC) as a function of the maximum feature subset size for a cluster, Kmax. The other is the top
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100 precision rate, defined as the fraction of anomalous samples amongst the first 100 detected
samples. Lastly, instead of exhaustively searching over all feature subsets at order K, we trial-
add individual features to the top candidate feature subsets from order K − 1. At each order K,
starting from order 2, we only consider the top 500 candidates from order K − 1.
Two different sets of experiments were performed, one on synthetic data, and the other on
the network data mentioned earlier. In the synthetic dataset experiment, we used one unimodal
Gaussian with 10 dimensions to generate normal samples and two additional unimodal Gaussians
to generate two distinct anomalous clusters. The two anomalous clusters use the same distribution
as the normal distribution for nine of the ten features. Thus, they deviate from the normal
(null) distribution only on a single feature dimension (this “informative” feature dimension was
different for the two clusters). Their corresponding sample subsets consist of 2.5% of the whole
data batch Xu (so the proportion of anomalous samples in Xu is 5% of the total). The variance of
the informative features was chosen to be the same as that of the normal features, σ2n. Moreover
the mean of the informative feature under an anomalous cluster was chosen to be two standard
deviations away from the mean under the normal class, i.e. |µn − µa| = 2σn, where we use
subscripts n and a to denote ‘normal’ and ‘anomalous’, respectively. Thus, if we consider only
the informative feature dimension, the Bayes error rate in discriminating normal from anomalous
is 15.87%. After generating the synthetic data batch (with a size of ten thousand samples),
we randomly chose 20% of normal samples as ground-truth and used them to train the null
hypothesis. The remaining normal samples were used as part of the test batch, along with the
samples from the two anomalous clusters. This was repeated 10 times, with the performance
averaged.
For the network data, all the normal web flows from the three files were combined, making
nearly ten thousand normal web flows. We randomly selected 20% of these flows as ground-
truth normal samples to train the null, and treated the remaining normal flows as part of the test
batch, combined with either P2P or Zeus anomalous flows. We separately experimented with
P2P and Zeus flows. There were roughly 5 % of either P2P or Zeus flows in a given test batch.
Experiments for each scenario were averaged over 10 random train-test splits.
November 4, 2015 DRAFT
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Fig. 2: Synthetic data experiment: comparison of different schemes with 2 independent Gaussian
based anomalous feature subsets in (separate) 1-dim subspace
C. Experimental results
In Figure 2, we show the performance on the synthetic data. Note that both the proposed
scheme and [5] effectively capture groups of anomalies when the maximum feature subset
order is two. The first captured cluster (sample subset) consists of more than 95% anomalous
samples on average. However, as the maximum feature subset order increases, the “independence
tests” approach drops significantly in performance. This is because too many (assumed to be
independent) pairwise tests create many redundant features that are all used to evaluate cluster
anomalousness; use of these redundant features de-emphasizes, within the score function, the
important (low-order) feature subset. Also, we see an early advantage of using cluster-specific
DTs, compared to the single Bayesian Net approach. It appears that if an anomalous process
is strictly generated from a low order subspace and normal in other feature dimensions (as is
the case in this experiment) our cluster-specific DT approach outperforms a single Bayesian Net
approach.
In Figure 3 a), we show the performance for normal-P2P discrimination. Compared to [5],
which degrades in performance as more and more tests are included, we see superior performance
for the proposed method. There is a large batch of anomalous samples captured at maximum
order 6 by the proposed method, but both [9] and [5] did not capture this group effectively,
as seen in the top 100 precision figure. Also, both of these methods are outperformed by the
GMM baseline method. In Figure 3 b), we show the performance for normal-Zeus discrimination.
Again, at maximum feature subset order 6 the proposed method captures a large portion of the
anomalous flows – more than 50 Zeus flows were captured out of the first 100 flows detected
November 4, 2015 DRAFT
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(a) P2P
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(b) Zeus
Fig. 3: Network traffic data experiment: comparison of different schemes with P2P or Zeus
anomalies
by the proposed method. [5] performs poorly in this experiment, and again we observed that as
the number of tests increase, the independence assumption degrades the detection performance.
The single Bayesian Net approach in [9] also performs relatively poorly on this dataset.
V. EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we used the Bonferroni corrected score function to directly evaluate cluster
candidates. Alternatively, we could try to evaluate empirical p-values for this decision statistic, by
applying our detection strategy to (many) bootstrap test batches drawn from the null distribution.
It would be interesting to see whether such an approach gives comparable (or even better)
detection accuracy than use of the Bonferroni corrected score by itself. Such an approach could
also be used to determine whether any detected clusters are truly statistically significant. In
this work we showed detection accuracy as a function of the maximum feature subset size for
a cluster. As the maximum feature subset size continues to increase, we observed that false
positives also increase in the first detected cluster, and the objective in (4) tends to favor the
maximum feature dimension over use of fewer dimensions. In future, we should propose and
investigate criteria for choosing this maximum feature subset size.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a GAD scheme to identify anomalous sample and feature sub-
sets, accounting for dependencies between the features in a given subset. The proposed model
outperforms previous works that assume statistical tests are independent under the null. We
demonstrated the effectiveness of our proposed system on both synthetic and real world data,
with the latter drawn from the network intrusion detection domain, aiming to discriminate
between normal and P2P/Zeus traffic. Our future work includes empirical p-value assessment
and automatic determination of the maximum feature subset size of a cluster.
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